Closed-Loop Policies for Operational Tests of Safety-Critical Systems by Morton, Jeremy et al.
Closed-Loop Policies for Operational Tests of Safety-Critical Systems
Jeremy Morton∗, Tim A. Wheeler∗, and Mykel J. Kochenderfer
Abstract—Manufacturers of safety-critical systems must make
the case that their product is sufficiently safe for public deploy-
ment. Much of this case often relies upon critical event outcomes
from real-world testing, requiring manufacturers to be strategic
about how they allocate testing resources in order to maximize
their chances of demonstrating system safety. This work frames
the partially observable and belief-dependent problem of test
scheduling as a Markov decision process, which can be solved
efficiently to yield closed-loop manufacturer testing policies. By
solving for policies over a wide range of problem formulations,
we are able to provide high-level guidance for manufacturers
and regulators on issues relating to the testing of safety-critical
systems. This guidance spans an array of topics, including
circumstances under which manufacturers should continue test-
ing despite observed incidents, when manufacturers should test
aggressively, and when regulators should increase or reduce the
real-world testing requirements for safety-critical systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Trust must be established in safety-critical systems prior
to their widespread release. Establishing confidence is often
difficult due to vast numbers of operational states and infre-
quent failures. For example, showing that autonomous vehicles
are as safe as humans requires performing better than the
estimated 530 thousand miles driven between police-reported
crashes in the United States, and an estimated 100 million
miles driven between fatal crashes [1]. Real-world testing that
is too aggressive may yield hazardous events that diminish
confidence in system safety. Each manufacturer must devise
a testing strategy capable of providing sufficient evidence
that their system is safe enough for widespread adoption.
Automotive manufacturers can build confidence by conducting
test drives on public roadways and make the safety case
based on the frequency of observed hazardous events like
disengagements and traffic accidents. A manufacturer that is
reluctant to test their product may forfeit opportunities to
identify and address shortcomings, and may ultimately not be
able to compete in the market.
The fundamental tension between the desire to thoroughly
test a product and the urgency to forgo further testing in
favor of bringing the product to market is not unique to
safety-critical systems. Prior work has studied this dilemma
in the context of software engineering, where developers must
determine whether to delay commercial release in order to
devote more time to fixing bugs in their product [2]–[5]. For
example, Cha´vez develops a decision-analytic rule for when to
halt software testing. The rule relies on a Bayesian estimate
of the bug discovery rate, and weighs costs associated with
immediate or delayed bug fixing, loss of market position, and
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customer dissatisfaction [2]. Littlewood and Wright derive two
Bayesian stopping rules for testing safety-critical software,
showing the advantages of a conservative reliability-based
stopping rule [6].
While relevant, these analyses related to software engineer-
ing do not directly translate to all safety-critical systems. In
software engineering, a developer is often free to release a
product whenever they like—any remaining bugs may cause
consumer dissatisfaction, but will not be life-threatening. In
contrast, a safety-critical physical system risks inflicting seri-
ous injury, death, damage to property, or environmental harm.
Thus, the decision of when a safety-critical system is safe
enough for release will likely be made by policymakers not
manufacturers, and manufacturers will likely decide how they
should test their product in order to maximize their odds of
demonstrating its safety.
This work investigates a test scheduling problem for safety-
critical systems, which seeks the best testing schedule to
maximize the likelihood of reaching confidence in a candidate
system’s safety. We present a novel method for deriving
closed-loop testing policies, defining the problem as a belief-
state Markov decision process (MDP), where high reward
is obtained when one becomes certain that the system is
safe enough for release. The finite-horizon belief-MDP can
be solved exactly using dynamic programming. Furthermore,
this approach relies on Bayesian beliefs, which allows prior
information to shape manufacturers’ decisions and alter their
real-world testing burden. Several parametric studies shed
insight into test scheduling strategies for real-world automotive
manufacturers and regulatory bodies. Though inspired by the
challenges of testing autonomous vehicles, the model and
its implications are more generally applicable to any safety-
critical system that generates inexhaustible and measurable
adverse events over a time period or test distance. A section on
applying the model to autonomous vehicles is included prior
to the conclusions.
II. A BAYESIAN TESTING FRAMEWORK
Modern testing theory for safety-critical systems typically
follows a frequentist approach [7]–[9]. This work deviates
from much of the previous work by adopting a Bayesian
framework, incorporating informative priors, and deriving of-
fline closed-loop policies. Under a Bayesian framework, data
is observed and used to incrementally update a belief. The
belief over the unknown hazardous event rate is described
probabilistically and changes as information is gathered. Under
a frequentist framework, data is assumed to come from a
repeatable random sample. The frequentist treats the studies
as repeatable, whereas the Bayesian treats the studies as fixed.
Bayesian priors may not always provide coverage—that
is, an inferred 95 % credible interval is not guaranteed to
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contain the true value 95 % of the time over infinite repeated
experiments [10]. However, the power associated with the
inclusion of Bayesian priors lies in its ability to incorporate
informative prior information [11].
The Bayesian framework is well suited to clearly formulat-
ing initial belief, calculating the updated belief as information
is gathered, and thus for deriving closed-loop policies that in-
corporate the updated belief to inform future testing. The belief
and the derived optimal policy are therefore influenced by the
assumed form of the prior belief. A frequentist also makes
prior assumptions, but these assumptions are not made explicit
in the same way they are for the Bayesian approach [12].
III. HAZARDOUS EVENT RATES
Suppose that the safety of a safety-critical system is judged
based on an expected frequency of hazardous events. Haz-
ardous events such as injuries, fatalities, and disengagements
are measurable and their frequency of occurrence should be
minimized [13]. A hazardous event frequency is the expected
number of hazardous events observed when operating over
a given distance or duration of time. The ISO 26262 stan-
dard, for example, defines automotive safety integrity levels
according to expected hazardous events per unit time [14].
This work measures hazardous events per unit distance due
to the less ambiguous nature of having to test over a fixed
distance. Knowing the average system speed allows one to
convert between the two formulations.
The event frequency of a particular hazardous event for a
system under test, λsys, is the expected number of hazardous
events encountered when the system is operated over a ref-
erence test distance dtest. The system is considered safe with
respect to the hazardous event when there is credible belief
that the event frequency is lower than a reference threshold
frequency, λref. Such a reference frequency may be specified
by regulators.
Our model assumes that testing is conducted uniformly
across the operational design domain. In reality, the number
of encountered hazardous events may vary according to the
specific portion of the design domain covered during the test,
and not all portions of the design domain are as easily tested.
Testing that favors certain scenarios over others may draw
incorrect conclusions.
Many statistical methods have been proposed for modeling
the rate of hazardous events in roadway driving [15]–[18].
Among the most common are Poisson and Poisson-Gamma
(negative binomial) models [19]. Wachenfeld used a Poisson
distribution to model the probability of k hazardous events
when driving dtest kilometers with a vehicle whose event
frequency is λsys as a Poisson distribution [13]:
P (k;λsys) =
1
k!
λksyse
−λsys k = 0, 1, 2, . . . (1)
Poisson distributions capture the probability of a given
number of independent, non-exhaustive events occurring in
a fixed interval of time or distance given only an average
rate of occurrence. The hazardous events under question tend
to be extremely rare and arise from the stochastic nature
of the driving environment in a manner that they can be
assumed to be independent. The rarity of hazardous events
also justifies the assumption that the hazardous events are non-
exhaustive. Vehicles can be quickly repaired or replaced by
the manufacturer in the event of a hazardous event. If many
hazardous events occur, it is unlikely that the system will ever
establish a high level of safety.
Suppose the core objective of validation is to establish a
minimum credibility level Cref that safety has been achieved:
P (λsys ≤ λref) ≥ Cref. (2)
Thus, a belief over the system’s event frequency must be
established in order to quantify this release criterion.1
IV. DECISION-THEORETIC FORMULATIONS
This section formulates the safety-critical system test
scheduling problem using three successively simpler decision
making frameworks. The first, the ρPOMDP, is perhaps the
most naturally applicable framework. A key insight in this
work is the reformulation of the test scheduling problem as
a belief MDP, thereby allowing for efficient calculation of
policies. The third formulation is a lossless transformation of
the belief MDP into an MDP, which aids in interpreting the
resulting policies.
A. ρPOMDP
A Markov decision process (MDP) models a sequential
decision making problem in a stochastic environment. It
is defined by the tuple 〈S,A, T,R,H〉. At any time step
t ∈ [1, H], the system is in a state s contained in the state
space S, and the agent must select an action a from the
action space A. The transition function T (s′ | s, a) provides
the probability of transitioning from state s to state s′ when
taking the action a and the reward function R(s, a, s′) gives
the immediate reward for the transition [20]. While originally
developed in the context of operations research, MDPs have
since been applied to problems in a broad range of fields,
including economics and optimal control [21], [22].
A policy pi for an MDP is a mapping from states to actions,
where pi(s) denotes the action taken at state s. Decision
makers seek the optimal policy that maximizes the expected
accumulated reward
∑H
t=1 rt, where rt is the reward for
transition t. Optimal policies for finite-horizon MDPs can be
computed using dynamic programming [23].
Many problems include uncertainty in the current state and
must make inferences about the underlying state based on
noisy or partial observations. Uncertainty of this form can be
handled by partially observable MDPs, or POMDPs. In lieu of
a state, POMDP policies operate on probability distributions
over states, inferred from the past sequence of actions and
observations. These beliefs, denoted b(s), give the probability
of being in state s. The space of beliefs is often continuous,
1An alternative to the probability-density based objective, the reliability
prediction-based stopping rule P (no failures in the next n0tests) ≥ Cref has
been shown to produce more conservative policies that more adequately draw
conclusions about system reliability [6]. This stopping rule can be directly
used in place of Eq. (2).
Table I: Problem formulations
ρPOMDP S hazardous event rate λsys
A number of tests n
O number of hazardous events k
Belief MDP S Gamma belief over λsys, 〈α, β〉
A number of tests n
MDP S cumulative hazardous events and tests, 〈K,N〉
A number of tests n
which can make finding an optimal policy for a POMDP
intractable [24], [25].
The reward function for a POMDP has the same form as
that of an MDP, R(s, a, s′). In the test scheduling problem,
however, we do not know a system’s true safety level. The re-
ward function in such a problem must instead be dependent on
the belief, R(b, a, b′). The term ρPOMDP refers to POMDPs
with with belief-dependent rewards that are piecewise linear
and convex [26]. Solving ρPOMDPs is an active area of
research [27].
The test scheduling problem can be framed as a ρPOMDP.
The state is the system’s hazardous event rate, λsys, and
the action is the number of tests n of duration dtest the
manufacturer conducts. The state is unobserved, and instead
must be inferred from the number of hazardous events, k,
encountered during testing. The transition function for the
ρPOMDP in the baseline formulation does nothing; the true
hazardous event rate λsys is assumed constant. The state,
action, and observation space are listed in Table I.
The reward function contains two objectives: a terminal
reward for achieving sufficient credibility in the safety of the
system and a penalty for every hazardous event. We use a
scalar parameter η ∈ [0, 1] to trade off between the penalty and
reward. The belief and observation-dependent reward function
is written:
R(b, n, k, b′) = η isterminal(b′)− (1− η)k, (3)
where the method isterminal is an indicator function that re-
turns one if the successor belief provides sufficient credibility
the system is safe and zero otherwise.
B. Belief-MDP
The ρPOMDP formulation is computationally difficult to
solve directly. A key insight into simplifying the problem is
that the belief can be represented as a Gamma distribution,
providing exact and efficient belief updates. Furthermore, the
reachable beliefs are all discrete offsets of the parameters of
the initial Gamma distribution, thereby resulting in a discrete
belief space that can be iterated over using dynamic pro-
gramming. We show that while the reachable set of beliefs is
infinite, optimal policies can be computed by only considering
a finite number of reachable beliefs.
1) Conjugate Prior: We extend Wachenfeld’s work by
representing the belief over the expected hazardous event rate
λ using the Gamma distribution with density:
p(λsys;α, β) =
βα
Γ(α)
λα−1sys e
−βλsys , (4)
where λsys ∈ (0,∞) and the belief is parameterized by the
shape α > 0 and the rate β > 0. The mean and variance
under a Gamma distribution are α/β and α/β2, respectively.
We write a belief over the hazardous event rate as
λsys ∼ Gamma(α, β). (5)
The Gamma distribution was chosen because it is a conjugate
prior to the Poisson distribution. That is, the posterior belief
formed by updating a Gamma distribution with an observation
produces a new belief that is also a Gamma distribution. If k
hazardous events are observed in the course of performing
n tests, each with reference test distance dtest, the Bayesian
posterior belief is updated according to:
λsys ∼ Gamma(α+ k, β + n). (6)
Such a Gamma belief over the mean of a Poisson-distributed
random variable is known as a Poisson-Gamma model. These
models are generally preferred to Poisson models in cases
where data exhibits over-dispersion, as is often the case with
automotive accident data [19].
The credibility of the system safety can be quantified
according to:
P (λsys ≤ λref;α, β) =
∫ λref
0
p(λ;α, β) dλ, (7)
which can be evaluated with the aid of the incomplete Gamma
function. When α and β are integer values, the quantity above
can be expressed as
P (λsys ≤ λref;α, β) = 1− e−βλref
α−1∑
m=0
(βλref)
m
m!
. (8)
The mean and variance under a Poisson-Gamma model are
α/β and α/β2, respectively.
It can be shown that if the hazardous event rate is distributed
according to a Poisson-Gamma model, then the number of
hazardous events encountered during n trials is governed by
the negative binomial distribution [28]:
P (k;n, α, β) =(
k + nα− 1
k
)(
1
1 + β
)k (
β
1 + β
)nα
.
(9)
For brevity, we denote the distribution above as NB(nα, β).
The expected number of hazardous events encountered in n
tests is nα/β.
2) Formulation: The test scheduling problem is formulated
as a belief MDP. Each state parameterizes a Gamma distribu-
tion over the expected hazardous event rate. The state space
is thus the Gamma distribution parameters 〈α, β〉, with shape
α > 0 and rate β > 0. The actions are still the number of
tests to conduct. The transition function is the belief update
Eq. (6), and the reward function is:
R(α, β, n, k) = η isterminal(α+ k, β + n)− (1− η)k, (10)
where α and β parameterize the initial belief and the method
isterminal(·) is run on the posterior belief. The belief-MDP
representation is summarized in Table I. The set of reachable
beliefs is countably infinite.
C. MDP
Intuition is boosted by making a lossless transformation to
an MDP whose states consist of the number of tests conducted
and the number of hazardous events observed. Optimal policies
obtained for the resulting MDP have equivalent counterparts
in the belief MDP. Let the state space S be the set of all tuples
〈K,N〉, corresponding to the cumulative number of hazardous
events K encountered in N total tests. The action space A is
the set of all nonnegative integers corresponding to the number
of tests to perform in the next quarter. We first present the
baseline MDP formulation, where the MDP state is equivalent
to the belief over system safety (〈K,N〉 ⇔ 〈α, β〉). We then
explain how this formulation can be extended to account for
manufacturer innovation and prior beliefs over system safety.
The reward function for the MDP is still belief-dependent,
but is expressed in terms of the current state, number of tests,
and number of observed adverse events. The reward function
for the baseline problem formulation is given by:
R(K,N, n, k) = η isterminal(K+k,N+n)−(1−η)k. (11)
In the test scheduling problem, we seek a policy pi∗ : S → A
that prescribes the optimal number of tests to perform in each
state.
1) Maximizing Immediate Reward: We first demonstrate
how to find a policy that maximizes the immediate reward ob-
tained by a manufacturer. We know the optimal test scheduling
policy will maximize the expected reward:
pi∗(K,N) = arg max
n
E
k
[R(K,N, n, k)] , (12)
where k ∼ NB(nK,N).
We know that
E
k
[(1− η)k] = (1− η)nK
N
, (13)
but computing Ek[η isterminal(K + k,N + n)] requires tak-
ing an expectation over a countably infinite set of values
for k. However, close inspection of Eq. (8) reveals that if
P (λsys ≤ λref;K + k˜, N + n) ≤ Cref for some k˜, then
P (λsys ≤ λref;K + k,N + n) ≤ Cref for all k ≥ k˜. Thus,
it is possible to calculate Ek[η isterminal(K + k,N + n)] ef-
ficiently by iterating until a value of k is encountered such
that it is not possible to reach a terminal state.
Finding an optimal policy for each state requires finding a
value of n that maximizes the expected reward. However, we
cannot just loop over all values of n to find the optimal value,
as the number of possibilities are countably infinite. Hence,
we desire an upper bound on n∗, the optimal amount of tests
to perform. Note that the expected reward has a lower bound
of zero, as it is always an option to not perform any tests and
receive no reward. Furthermore, it is clear that isterminal(·)
has an upper bound of one. Using these properties, we find an
upper bound on n∗:
0 ≤ E
k
[η isterminal(K + k,N + n∗)− (1− η)k] (14)
≤ η − (1− η)n∗K
N
(15)
=⇒ n∗ ≤ η
1− η
N
K
. (16)
2) Baseline Test-Scheduling Problem: We now formulate a
decision problem under which testing decisions can be made
over the course of multiple quarters. In this sequential decision
problem, we must consider the possible rewards that can be
received far into the future, not just immediate rewards. If
we wish to derive a testing schedule over the course of T
quarters, then we must solve for policies that are functions of
both the state 〈K,N〉 ∈ S , as well as the current time step
t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}.
For each state and time step, the aim is to determine the
optimal utility, which captures the expected reward that will be
received at all future time steps through following the optimal
policy. According to the Bellman equation, the optimal utility
U∗(K,N, t) will satisfy the recurrence [23]:
U∗(K,N, t) = max
n
E
k
[R(K,N, n, k)
+ γU∗(K + k,N + n, t+ 1)],
(17)
where γ ∈ [0, 1] is the discount factor, a parameter that
discounts rewards received in future time steps. We can limit
the number of values of n that we must consider by using the
upper bound derived in Eq. (14). Furthermore, for any terminal
state 〈K,N〉 it is assumed that U∗(K,N, t) = 0 for any time
step t.
The optimal policy for the terminal time step T will be
equivalent to the optimal policy under the immediate reward
model, as it is not possible to attain any subsequent rewards.
Thus, the optimal policy and associated utility can be found
for each state 〈K,N〉 ∈ S at the terminal time step, and
then a single backward sweep through time can be performed
using Eq. (17) to calculate optimal utilities and policies at all
preceding time steps.
In order to calculate the expected utility in future
time steps Ek[U∗(K + k,N + n, t+ 1)], we must again
take an expectation over a countably infinite number
of hazardous events. However, it can be shown that if
U∗(K + k˜, N + n, t+ 1) = 0 for some non-terminal state
〈K + k˜, N + n〉, then U∗(K + k,N + n, t + 1) = 0 for all
k ≥ k˜ (see appendix). Thus, we only consider the utility of
the future states up to the point that a state is encountered that
is both non-terminal and has zero utility.
3) Innovation Bonus: The baseline test scheduling problem
described above does not allow for the safety of a system to
improve over time through research and development. Hence,
we propose a modification to the baseline problem formulation
that allows the safety of a system to evolve stochastically
over time through an innovation bonus. To accommodate
this change, the state space is augmented with an additional
integer-valued innovation term βI that alters the expected
number of hazardous events that will be encountered in future
testing.
Between subsequent quarters, the change in innovation level
∆βI is drawn according to a categorical distribution over
integer values and scaled linearly according to the number of
tests performed. The scaling of innovation with tests models
the ability of manufacturers to identify and remedy problems
with their system in the course of real-world testing. For a
given state 〈K,N, βI〉 ∈ S , the number of hazardous events
10 20
10
20
Hazardous Events
D
riv
e
Te
st
s
Quarter 1
10 20
Hazardous Events
Quarter 2
10 20
Hazardous Events
Quarter 3
10 20
Hazardous Events
Quarter 4
10 20
Hazardous Events
Quarter 5
0
2
4
6
8
Figure 1: Example five-quarter testing policy with parameters shown in Table II. The innovation distribution contains
probabilities of P (∆βI = 0) = 1/2, P (∆βI = 1) = 1/4, and P (∆βI = 2) = 1/4. Each square in a given plot corresponds to
a state 〈K,N〉, and the color of the square corresponds to the number of tests that the policy prescribes for that state. States
corresponding to lower observed hazardous event rates can be found in the top left of each plot, and states corresponding to
higher observed rates can be found in the bottom right. As such, terminal states can be found in the dark blue regions that
occupy the top left of each plot.
encountered in n tests is distributed according to a negative
binomial distribution that accounts for the current innovation
level:
k ∼ NB(nK,N + βI). (18)
Thus, while the innovation bonus cannot alter the number
of hazardous events that have already occurred, it can make
further hazardous events more or less likely depending on the
value of βI . Positive innovation bonuses decrease the expected
number of hazardous events and negative innovation bonuses
increase the expected number. In the absence of an innovation
bonus, the distribution over future hazardous events is the same
as the distribution in the baseline test scheduling problem.
Hence, the exact form of the innovation distribution will guide
manufacturer decisions about when they should perform tests,
as it can influence their beliefs about whether the safety of the
system will change relative to its observed performance.
4) Prior Belief: The test scheduling formulations presented
above have assumed the absence of any relevant information
that might influence a manufacturer’s belief about the safety of
the system under test. However, in testing a real-world system,
there may exist several relevant sources of information that
would guide expectations about how that system will perform
in future tests. For example, a manufacturer may wish to
incorporate confidence based on simulation-based testing, or
confidence due to the system under test being a variant of a
previously certified system.
Suppose we have relevant experience that shows a haz-
ardous event frequency µ, and we would like to use it to
construct a prior for our belief over λsys, the hazardous event
frequency of interest. As a prior belief over λsys, we can
assume it is drawn from a Gamma distribution with mean
µ and user-specified variance σ2. A small value of σ2 would
indicate a strong belief that the true value of λsys is close to
µ, while a large value of σ2 would indicate that µ may not be
very informative about the true value of λsys.
We introduce the values α0 and β0, which will parameterize
the prior distribution over λsys:
λsys ∼ Gamma(α0, β0). (19)
Using the mean and variance of the Poisson-Gamma model,
we find the following relations [29]:
µ =
α0
β0
, σ2 =
α0
β20
. (20)
Rearranging and solving, we find that β0 = µ/σ2 and α0 =
µβ0. By performing tests, we can incrementally update our
belief over the hazardous event frequency of interest through
the posterior distribution:
λsys ∼ Gamma(α0 +K,β0 +N). (21)
By incorporating this prior belief, the baseline test schedul-
ing problem is modified in two ways. First, the reward function
changes, as the inclusion of prior knowledge alters the amount
of experience required to reach a terminal state:
isterminal(K,N) =
1 {P (λsys ≤ λref;K + α0, N + β0) ≥ Cref} .
(22)
Furthermore, prior belief can alter the distribution over the
number of hazardous events that may be encountered during
testing. The distribution over hazardous events is given by:
k ∼ NB (n(K + α0), N + β0 + βI) , (23)
where βI is the innovation bonus described previously.
An example five-quarter sequential policy is given in Fig. 1.
The innovation distribution is described in the figure caption,
and the remaining problem parameters can be found in Ta-
ble II. In each policy plot, the terminal states can be found
in the dark blue region of the upper left corner and the states
where no testing occurs can be found in the lighter blue region
in the bottom right corner. Note that testing tends to occur in
states adjacent to the terminal states. Furthermore, fewer tests
tend to occur in each state at early time steps, which can be
attributed to the influence of the discount factor.
V. PARAMETRIC STUDIES
In the following sections, we present a series of take-
aways that result from studying policies obtained through
Table II: Problem parameters for policy in Fig. 1
Cref λref η γ µ σ
2
0.95 1 0.95 1 0.5 0.1
Table III: Minimum reward ratio required for any testing when
K
N > λref.
Cref 0.90 0.95 0.99(
η
1−η
)
min
3.50×102 1.80×103 2.52×104
the procedures outlined above. These takeaways are meant to
provide insight to manufacturers as they grapple with high-
level decisions about system testing. We hope the following
analysis can provide guidance to both manufacturers and
regulators about how the testing and certification of safety-
critical systems can be accelerated in a safe manner.
A. If only concerned about immediate reward, a manufacturer
should avoid tests when the observed hazardous event rate
exceeds λref.
Of particular interest in the test scheduling problem are
scenarios where a safety-critical system has not demonstrated
the requisite safety level in prior testing. For example, consider
a system that has undergone one test and experienced two
hazardous events. If we assume that λref = 1, then the
observed hazardous event frequency for this system exceeds
the reference value. Such an outcome is troubling; while
outside factors may have contributed to the observed hazardous
events, a hypothesis that the system is sufficiently safe now
requires heavy skepticism. Hence, it is worth pondering the
circumstances under which it may be optimal to continue
testing a system with a subpar safety record.
If a manufacturer is only concerned about immediate reward
then they completely discount reward that can be received in
subsequent quarters. Thus, they must weigh the reward for
achieving strong belief that safety requirements are met against
the penalty associated with hazardous events that occur during
testing. By modifying the structure of the reward function, we
can incentivize or discourage testing in different regions of
the state space. In Table III, we present the minimum reward
ratio ( η1−η ) required in order for any tests to be administered
when the observed hazardous event rate exceeds the reference
value λref = 1 (i.e. when K/N > 1). Results are presented
for credibility levels of 90 %, 95 %, and 99 %.
From the table, we see that the reward associated with
reaching a terminal state must be at least hundreds to thou-
sands of times larger than the cost associated with a hazardous
event in order for any testing to be performed in cases
where a safety-critical system has not met the reference safety
standard in previous testing. It is unrealistic to assume that
any manufacturer would care so little about hazardous events,
in particular fatalities, that they would have such a lopsided
reward function. Therefore, we conclude that manufacturers
should not make an all-at-once attempt to prove the safety of
a system if previous tests have shown the system to have an
inadequate safety record.
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Figure 2: Regions of the state space where testing occurs for
baseline problem, baseline with innovation bonus, and baseline
with prior belief.
B. Expected innovation and prior beliefs can justify more
testing.
In contrast with manufacturers who are myopic in pursuing
immediate rewards, the sequential test scheduling problem
allows a manufacturer to reason about how their system’s
safety record may improve in future testing. The two primary
mechanisms that can justify such optimism are (1) expecta-
tions of improved system performance through innovation and
(2) prior beliefs that suggest the system is likely to operate
safely in the future. In practice, innovation or prior beliefs may
make it optimal to perform tests in certain states 〈K,N〉 ∈ S
where testing would not occur in the baseline sequential test
scheduling problem.
This more aggressive testing strategy is shown in Fig. 2. The
baseline region of the plot illustrates the states where it would
be optimal to perform any tests during the first of five quarters
in the baseline problem associated with Table II. Furthermore,
the plot shows how the testing region varies with either the
inclusion of an innovation bonus described in the caption of
Fig. 1 or the incorporation of a prior belief with µ = 0.5
and σ2 = 0.1. Both sources of optimism cause the region
of the state space where testing occurs to extend downward,
which signifies that testing is occurring in states associated
with higher observed hazardous event rates. An additional
effect of incorporating prior experience can be noticed as well,
as the upper bound of the testing region is decreased. In this
case, the prior experience inspires a stronger belief that the
system is sufficiently safe, which reduces the testing burden
and increases the number of terminal states.
Figure 2 provides illustrative examples of scenarios where
manufacturers should be willing to tolerate higher hazardous
event rates and continue testing. With the innovation bonus,
manufacturers expect their system to become safer over time,
and hence assume that the hazardous event rates encountered
in future testing will be lower. In contrast, relevant experience
can inspire optimism that the system is in fact already safer
than what has been observed so far, and that higher hazardous
Table IV: Testing strategies for various discount factors
γ 0.5 0.75 1.0
Average number of tests per state 3.20 2.44 2.16
Fraction of states with testing 0.09 0.11 0.13
event rates may be anomalous and likely to decrease in future
tests.
C. A patient manufacturer tests incrementally, but may toler-
ate higher hazardous event rates.
Manufacturers are motivated to be the first to market. They
must balance the risk of aggressive testing against the relative
safety of letting the research and development team improve
system safety over a longer time horizon. In the sequential
test scheduling problem, the balance between this desire for
immediate over long-term rewards is controlled by a discount
factor γ. In the limit as γ → 0, all future rewards are neglected,
and the policy in each quarter should be identical to the policy
for a manufacturer that only cares about immediate rewards.
However, as the value of the discount factor approaches one,
future rewards are valued as much as immediate rewards, and
the optimal testing strategy for a manufacturer can change
considerably.
The change in testing strategy as γ → 1 manifests itself
in two ways, both of which are most apparent in early time
steps. First, in states where testing does occur, the number
of tests tend to decrease. Second, there is an increase in
the number of states where testing occurs. Table IV shows
the average number of tests performed in each state and the
fraction of nonterminal states where testing occurs as the
discount factor is varied between 0.5 and 1 for the first quarter
of a test scheduling problem that otherwise is defined by the
parameters given in Table II. While these results are for a
single problem instantiation, they are illustrative of a trend
that is observed in sequential test scheduling problems with
a variety of reward structures, innovation distributions, and
forms of relevant experience.
The first change in testing strategy, where fewer tests are
performed in each state, comes from tests being delayed until
the end of the finite time horizon. Reward is not discounted,
so there is no penalty in delaying a large portion of testing
until the final quarter.
The second change in testing strategy, that a higher discount
factor makes it optimal to perform tests in more states, is
somewhat counterintuitive. The states where testing becomes
optimal as γ → 1 are associated with higher hazardous event
rates. As such, it is undesirable to perform too many tests
in these states, which means it may take several quarters
of testing before a manufacturer can achieve a sufficiently
strong belief that their system is safe. Because this terminal
reward signal can be quite delayed for states associated with
a higher hazardous event rate, testing is only worthwhile if a
manufacturer is patient and does not heavily discount future
rewards relative to immediate rewards.
There is extensive interplay between the effect of man-
ufacturer patience and the optimism engendered by the in-
novation bonus and prior beliefs. In states associated with
higher hazardous event rates, expected innovation or outside
information can spur a manufacturer to believe that hazardous
event rates could be lower in future tests. However, depending
on the strength of this belief, manufacturers may only find it
worthwhile to perform a limited number of tests. Hence, such
restrained testing is most justified in cases where a delayed
terminal reward for making it to market still outweighs the
costs of hazardous events that occur during testing.
D. In the sequential decision problem, it can be optimal to
perform tests even though the observed hazardous event rate
exceeds λref.
Manufacturers that only value immediate rewards do not
perform incremental testing or consider how the performance
of their system may improve over time. Instead, they only use
the observed performance of their system in order to predict
how it will fare in future testing. In previous sections, we
have shown how expected improvement, relevant experience,
and the discount factor all interact to guide manufacturer
decisions when system testing is performed over the course of
several quarters instead of all at once. Furthermore, we have
shown how these components of the sequential test scheduling
problem can inspire manufacturers to be more aggressive about
testing in states associated with higher hazardous event rates.
Under certain circumstances, it is optimal to perform testing
even though previous tests have yielded an observed hazardous
rate that exceeds λref. The gray curves in Fig. 3 show the
maximum observed hazardous event rate, (K/N)max, under
which it would be optimal to perform any testing for the
testing policies shown in Fig. 1. These curves illustrate mul-
tiple instances where it is optimal to perform testing even
though the hazardous event rate exceeds λref = 1. The values
of (K/N)max are plotted against the total number of tests
performed, meaning that hazardous event rates associated
with a smaller number of tests exhibit a higher level of
variance. Hence, it is clear that manufacturers can choose to
be more aggressive with testing in cases where there is more
uncertainty in a system’s estimated safety level.
While we have shown that it can be optimal to perform tests
in cases where the observed hazardous event rate is higher
than the reference standard, it is worth stressing that such
circumstances are rare. The black curves in Fig. 3 illustrate
optimal release decisions for the baseline problem associated
with Table II (i.e. the same problem without the innovation
bonus or relevant experience). These curves show that under
such circumstances it is never optimal to perform testing
when the hazardous event rate exceeds λref. Thus, in many
cases it is not optimal to continue testing when previous
performance has shown a system to be insufficiently safe.
However, the following factors would make it more likely that
it is worthwhile to continue testing a safety-critical system that
has already experienced a high number of hazardous events:
1) High uncertainty in the hazardous event rate (few tests
have been performed).
2) Many more quarters remaining for testing.
3) High reward for reaching a terminal state relative to
penalty for hazardous events.
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Figure 3: Maximum observed hazardous event rate for which safety-critical systems would be released as a function of total
number of tests performed. The gray curves show values for the policies shown in Fig. 1 with innovation probabilities of
P (∆βI = 0) = 1/2, P (∆βI = 1) = 1/4, and P (∆βI = 2) = 1/4. The black curves show values for the optimal policies of
the associated baseline problem without innovation.
4) High likelihood of improvement through innovation.
5) Prior encodes strong belief that the system is safer than
previous tests suggest.
6) High discount factor (γ ≈ 1).
E. Incorporating prior beliefs can change the amount of
required testing.
Aside from influencing testing decisions for manufacturers,
prior beliefs can also provide insights about how regulators
may be able to alleviate the immense real-world testing bur-
den necessary to prove the safety of advanced safety-critical
systems such as automated vehicles. Rather than making
the safety case entirely through tests, it may be possible to
augment testing experience with other sources of information,
such as performance in simulation.
The stronger the belief that the relevant experience is
predictive of the safety level of the system under test, the
stronger it will bias the estimate of the hazardous event rate for
that system. This trust in the predictive value of the experience
is encoded in its estimated variance, σ2, and will need to be
determined on a case-by-case basis. In Fig. 4, we see the effect
that different values of µ and σ2 have on the real-world testing
burden required to prove system safety. The top three plots
show the change in the number of terminal states in a 50×50
state space (K ∈ {1, . . . , 50}, N ∈ {1, . . . , 50}) for three
values of µ and a range of variance values when Cref = 0.95
and λref = 1. Reaching a terminal state means no additional
testing is required to prove system safety. Thus, an increase
in the number of terminal states means that the testing burden
is reduced, while a decrease in the number of terminal states
signifies that even more testing should be performed to prove
system safety.
Three distinct behaviors can be observed for different values
of µ. In the top left plot, when µ = 0.5, we see what is deemed
Type 1 behavior, where at low variance values there is an
increase in the number of terminal states, with the change in
terminal states trending toward zero as the variance becomes
large and the prior becomes non-informative. In contrast, in
the top right plot, when µ = 1 we see Type −1 behavior,
where the number of terminal states decreases for all variance
values and the change tends toward zero for large variances.
In the top middle plot, when µ = 0.9, we see Type 0 behavior,
which like Type 1 behavior exhibits an increase in the number
of terminal states at low variance values and little net effect at
high variances. Interestingly, however, at intermediate variance
values it shows a decrease in the number of terminal states
(and hence an increased testing burden). This behavior arises
because µ is close to λref, and at moderate variance levels
the uncertainty is high enough that we must consider that the
hazardous event rate for the system may actually exceed the
reference standard.
The bottom three plots of Fig. 4 show that the testing burden
can change as µ and Cref vary. For Cref ≥ 0.95, we see that for
µ < λref there is either Type 1 or Type 0 behavior, while for
µ > λref there is always Type −1 behavior. This provides two
practical takeaways for regulators. First, if a manufacturer can
demonstrate through relevant experience that their hazardous
event rate may be lower than the reference standard, then it is
possible that their testing burden can be reduced, although this
depends on the assumed predictive power of such experience.
Second, if relevant experience suggests that a safety-critical
system may not be sufficiently safe, then there should always
be an enhanced real-world testing burden on the manufacturer.
F. When should the most testing be performed?
We have studied the conditions necessary to make it worth-
while for a manufacturer to perform any tests, but we have
not yet addressed a related question: under which conditions
should a manufacturer perform the most testing? In particular,
it is worth considering which observed hazardous event rates
should make a manufacturer most motivated to aggressively
test their safety-critical system. To provide a clearer answer
to this question, Fig. 5 plots the optimal number of tests to
perform in a terminal time step against the observed hazardous
event rate with η = 0.99 and Cref = 0.95. The high terminal
reward and lack of opportunity for future tests in this problem
provides a strong incentive for performing a large amount of
immediate testing. With a large amount of testing performed,
it is easier to see a trend in the results.
The points in Fig. 5 are colored according to the number
of tests already performed, and hence the color can be seen
to represent the variance in the hazardous event rate estimate.
The lighter points therefore exhibit highest variance, while the
darker points have the lowest variance. This figure shows that
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Figure 5: Optimal number of tests to perform as a function of
observed hazardous event rate with η = 0.99 and Cref = 0.95.
The color of each point represents the number of tests already
performed.
the largest number of tests tend to occur in states with low
hazardous event rates and high variance. Hence, manufacturers
should be most aggressive about testing in circumstances when
their observed hazardous event rate is low, but they have not
Table V: Hazardous event frequencies [32], [33].
Disengagement Rate 0.121 per 1000 km
Rate of Reported Collisions 12.5 per 100 million km
Fatality Rate 0.70 per 100 million km
yet performed sufficient testing to credibly demonstrate that
their system meets the reference safety standard.
VI. APPLICATION TO AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES
The development of autonomous vehicles presents unprece-
dented challenges in safety validation [7], [8], [13], [30].
Koopman and Wagner outline several specific challenges in
autonomous vehicle testing and validation, including the in-
feasibility of complete testing, the inability to rely on humans
to intervene, and the difficulty of testing systems that may
be stochastic or learning-based [8]. Perhaps principal among
these challenges is that the space of driving situations is so
large that sufficient testing to ensure ultra-dependable system
operation is not possible. In showing that the fatality rate of an
active safety system is less than one fatality per 109 hours of
operation, one must conduct a multiple of 109 operation hours
of testing in order to achieve statistical significance [31].
The frequency of common hazardous events vary greatly
in magnitude. As Table V illustrates, the disengagement rate
differs from the fatality rate by five orders of magnitude.
Waymo has covered the largest test distance to date, with
over four million test miles [32], but even such distances
are merely sufficient for determining the likelihood of the
most common hazardous events. Proper estimates for the
fatality rate require driving a multiple of the average 70
million kilometers between collisions for human drivers [33].
Unfortunately, the rarest events are often the most critical in
determining whether to release an autonomous vehicle, leading
to significant uncertainty in the safety of a system even after
millions of miles of testing.
The size and scope of the real-world testing burden that
manufacturers will face is currently unknown. Given the rarity
of the most extreme hazardous events, such as fatalities,
building a case that a system meets safety standards based
on observed hazardous event rates would require an infeasible
amount of real-world testing [7], [13], [34]. Recent research
has proposed methods aimed at reducing the amount of real-
world testing required from manufacturers. Such methods
include testing in virtual and hardware-in-the-loop simula-
tions, limiting the scope of real-world testing to safety-critical
scenarios, and using threat measures from near-collisions to
quantify system safety [1], [30], [35]–[37].
Successful application of the proposed model to au-
tonomous driving requires identifying suitable parameters.
Although exact values have not been established to date,
we can use hazardous event rates under human driving as
preliminary values for the reference frequency λref [30], [34].
The granularity of the test distance dtest is a free parameter.
The minimum credibility Cref is also a free parameter, but is
likely to be at a standard level such as 95 % or 99 %. The
reward tradeoff parameter η ∈ [0, 1] can also be adjusted
by the manufacturer. The value of η would vary according
to the hazardous event of interest, with values close to one
signifying that the reward associated with reaching a terminal
state far outweighs the cost of a single hazardous event. Trends
in innovation for batteries, sensors, and related technologies,
as well as aviation safety records can potentially be used to
estimate or bound the innovation bonus.
A more elusive parameter is the prior belief over the
system’s safety, parameterized by a Gamma distribution via α
and β. The choice of prior can significantly affect the result—
as is desired—and any serious use of the model must be able
to justify the prior used. The Gamma model does not allow for
encoding a uniform prior. Rather, a mean and variance must
be selected that adequately capture the manufacturer’s prior
belief. Possible sources by which such a mean and variance
can be justified include previously tested systems similar to
the system under test, the system’s performance on hazardous
events with higher encounter frequencies, and the system’s
performance in simulation.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This work introduced a method for deriving closed-loop
testing strategies for safety-critical systems. The problem
is formulated as a finite-horizon Markov decision process,
where policies map a system’s observed safety record to a
recommendation for how many tests should be carried out
in the next quarter. By performing parametric studies on
a set of optimal testing policies, we arrive at a series of
insights that can guide manufacturers. We discussed the range
of assumptions that manufacturers must make in order to
continue testing their product in circumstances where previous
testing has shown it to be insufficiently safe. Additionally,
we showed how regulators can use information obtained from
sources other than operational testing to reduce the testing
burden for a safety-critical system. Finally, we demonstrated
that manufacturers should perform the most testing in cases
where their observed hazardous event rate is low, but there is
high uncertainty in the estimate.
The initial goal of this project is to provide manufacturers
with high-level takeaways about relevant considerations relat-
ing to testing safety-critical systems, not to derive an optimal
testing policy for any particular system. As such, future work
must be dedicated to modifying the problem formulation
in areas where it lacks the appropriate level of fidelity. In
particular, further work is required in devising methods for
determining quantities such as the innovation bonus, discount
factor, and prior beliefs in a principled manner. Additionally,
our analysis does not account for the cost of performing tests,
but manufacturers may wish to account for such costs in de-
riving their own testing policies. To facilitate further analysis,
the code for this project has been released to the public, and
can be found at https://github.com/sisl/av_testing.
APPENDIX A
PROOF THAT SUBSEQUENT STATES HAVE ZERO UTILITY
Here, we prove that if U∗(K,N, t) = 0 for some state
〈K,N〉, then U∗(K + `,N, t) = 0 for all positive integers `.
We limit the proof in this section to ` = 1 and the terminal
time step T , but it follows inductively that the same analysis
holds for any greater ` and for all time steps t. We know that
the optimal utility at the terminal time step satisfies:
U∗(K,N, T ) = max
n
E
k
[η isterminal(K + k,N + n)
− (1− η)k],
(24)
where k ∼ NB(nK,N). If we encounter a state 〈K,N〉 where
U∗(K,N, T ) = 0, then we know that
E
k
[η isterminal(K + k,N + n)] ≤ (1− η)nK
N
(25)
for all n.
Now consider a state 〈K + 1, N〉. From Eq. (8):
E
k∼NB(n(K+1),N)
[isterminal(K + k + 1, N + n)]
≤ E
k∼NB(n(K+1),N)
[isterminal(K + k,N + n)].
(26)
We would like to show that
E
k∼NB(n(K+1),N)
[isterminal(K + k,N + n)]
≤ E
k∼NB(nK,N)
[isterminal(K + k,N + n)].
(27)
For each n, we can say that
E
k∼NB(nK,N)
[isterminal(K + k,N + n)]
=
k(n)∑
k=0
P (k;n,K,N),
(28)
where k(n) is the largest value of k such that isterminal(K +
k,N + n) takes on a value of one. Hence, the above quantity
represents the cumulative distribution function over k.
For the negative binomial distribution, the cumulative dis-
tribution function is given in terms of the regularized beta
function Ip(·) [38]. We have that
E
k∼NB(n(K+1),N)
[isterminal(K + k,N + n)]
= Ip(nK + n, k
(n) + 1)
(29)
and
E
k∼NB(nK,N)
[isterminal(K + k,N + n)]
= Ip(nK, k
(n) + 1),
(30)
where p = N/(1 +N). The regularized beta function has the
property that Ip(a + 1, b) ≤ Ip(a, b). Thus, we find that the
inequality in Eq. (27) holds.
We denote the expected utility of performing n tests as
U (n)(·). For each n, it follows that
U (n)(K + 1, N, T ) =
E
k
[η isterminal(K + k + 1, N + n)− (1− η)k], (31)
where k ∼ NB(n(K + 1), N). Using the inequalities in
Eq. (26) and Eq. (27), we find that
U (n)(K + 1, N, T ) ≤ E
k
[η isterminal(K + k,N + n)]
− (1− η)nK + 1
N
(32)
where k ∼ NB(nK,N). Finally, we use the result from
Eq. (25) to find that:
U (n)(K + 1, N, T ) ≤ (1− η)nK
N
− (1− η)nK + 1
N
(33)
= −(1− η) n
N
≤ 0. (34)
Thus, we see that performing any positive number of tests has
a negative expected utility, and hence U∗(K + 1, N, T ) = 0.
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